CAUSE, PRINCIPLE, CONDITION, AND OCCASION Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2022. Cause A cause is that which really and positively influences something, making that something depend upon it in a certain way. A cause is “a positive principle from which something really proceeds according to a dependence in being.”1 Causality is the aspect of a thing insofar as it influences the being of something else. A cause is a “principium per se influens esse in aliud.”2 A cause “importat influxum quedam ad esse causati.”3 A cause is “an ontological principle which exercises a positive influence upon the ‘to be’ of something else.”4 1 K. DOUGHERTY, Metaphysics, Graymoor Press, Peekskill, New York, 1965, p. 137. V. REMER, Summa Philosophiae Scholasticae, vol. II (Metaphysica generalis), seventh edition (revised by P. Geny), Gregoriana, Rome, 1947, p. 201. 3 In V Metaphys., lect. 1, no. 751. 4 H. J. KOREN, Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1965, p. 232. William A. Wallace, in his The Elements of Philosophy, states: “A cause is generally defined as that from which something else proceeds with a dependence in being”(W. WALLACE, The Elements of Philosophy, Alba House, Staten Island, New York, 1977, p. 100). Peter Coffey writes: “We understand by a cause anything which has a positive influence of any sort on the being or happening of something else”(P. COFFEY, Ontology, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1926, p. 357). Wallace observes that “the essential notion of cause is that it is a positive principle exerting some influence on a perfection or thing that is coming to be, i.e., an influx into being. This definition is general and obscure to the extent that cause is an analogous concept, for the precise manner of causing differs in various exercises of causality. The major types of cause, however, may be set out schematically in terms of the general doctrine on potency and act. Since a cause is that upon which the being of another thing depends, this being may be viewed under the aspect either of act or of potency. As act, its cause of being is a form by which it is constituted a being-in-act, thus called a formal cause. As potency, it further requires two other causes, namely, matter that is potential and an agent that reduces this matter from potency to act, known as the material cause and the efficient cause respectively. But the action of an agent tends to something determinate, and that to which it tends is called the end or final cause. Thus there are four basic types of cause. Each of these can also have subdivisions and various modes of acting”(W. WALLACE, op. cit., p. 101). R. P. Phillips notes that “there are then four ways in which the cause may pass into the effect; for it may be that by which the effect is produced, and we have an efficient cause; or that for whose sake the effect is produced, and we have a final cause; or that out of which it is produced, and we have a material cause; or that which makes the effect to be of a particular kind, and we have a formal cause. “A man building a house is its efficient cause; it is built to afford protection from the weather, and this is its final cause; it is made of bricks and mortar, its material cause; and it is a building and a building of a particular kind, which is its formal cause. All these four causes must combine in order that the house may be built, and therefore the house, which is the effect, is dependent for its existence on all four of them.”(R. P. PHILLIPS, Modern Thomistic Philosophy, vol. 2 [Metaphysics], The Newman Bookshop, Westminster, MD, 1935, p. 234). Sofia Vanni Rovighi explains that “causa è ciò che in qualche modo fa essere quello di cui è causa; causa, dicono gli scolastici, est principium per se influens esse in aliud (Cfr. REMER, Ontologia, pag. 201). Aristotele distingue quattro tipi di cause: causa materiale, formale, efficiente, finale. “Causa materiale è ciò di cui (ex quo) è fatta una cosa (Cfr. ARISTOTELE, Physic., lib. II, cap. 3), p. es. il bronzo rispetto alla statua; causa formale è ciò per cui (quo) una cosa è quello che è, è determinata (Cfr. Ibid.); causa efficiente è ciò da cui (a quo) la cosa deriva, ciò che attua, che fa passare una cosa dalla potenza all’atto (Cfr. Ibid.); causa finale è ciò in vista di cui (cuius gratia) si fa una cosa (Cfr. Ibid.). “Fanno essere la statua, se pur in modo diverso, sia il bronzo, sia la forma di statua, sia l’artista, sia lo scopo per cui l’artista lavora. 2 1 “Some of the most characteristic observations we can make after considering the notions of cause and effect are the following: “a) The effect’s dependence on the cause as regards the act of being is the counterpart of the real influence of the cause on the effect. A cause is a cause precisely to the extent that the effect cannot come to be or exist without it. A house, for instance, would not remain standing without the materials of which it is made and without a suitable arrangement of these elements. Neither would the house actually exist without the work of the people who built it, even though this work more directly influenced the coming into being of the house than its actual being. This two-fold way of influencing the effect enables us to define a cause as anything on which something depends with regard to its being or to its coming into being. “b) The real distinction between the cause and the effect is evident, since a real dependence of one thing on another necessarily implies their being really distinct from one another. “c) The primacy of the cause with respect to the effect: every cause, is, by nature, prior to its effect, since the perfection which the cause confers on or produces in the effect must first be present in the cause in some fashion. In many cases, thus natural primacy also entails precedence in time. Thus, parents come before their offspring, and a sculptor preceded the statue he makes. As far as the causal action itself is concerned, the effect and its cause are correlative and simultaneous. The cause is a cause when it is causing; the effect is an effect at the time it is being caused.”5 “Entre las notas que caracterizan la noción de causa y efecto se encuentran las siguientes: “ – dependencia efectiva en el ser: es como la contrapartida del influjo real de la causa en el efecto. Una causa es causa, justamente en la medida en que sin ella no puede comenzar a ser, o subsistir, el efecto. Una casa, por ejemplo, no podría mantenerse en pie sin los materiales que la integran y sin una disposición adecuada de esos elementos; pero tampoco existiría actualmente la “Forma e materia sono cause intrinseche all’effetto, ossia entrano a costituire l’effetto, fanno parte di esso; causa efficiente e finale sono invece cause estrinseche, ossia non fanno parte dell’effetto.”(S. VANNI ROVIGHI, Elementi di filosofia, vol. 2 [Metafisica], La Scuola, Brescia, 1964, p. 69). 5 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, pp. 185-186. “Fra le caratteristiche del rapporto causa-effetto si trovano le seguenti: “— dipendenza effettiva nell’essere: è la conseguenza dell’influsso reale della causa sull’effetto. Una causa è tale, proprio in quanto senza di essa l’effetto non può incominciare a essere o a sussistere. Una casa, ad esempio, non potrebbe stare in piedi senza i materiali che la compongono e senza una adeguata disposizione di questi elementi; ma la casa non esisterebbe senza il lavoro delle persone che l’hanno costruita, anche se tale lavoro ha influito più che sull’essere attuale, sul farsi dell’edificio. Questa duplice maniera di influire sull’effetto permette di definire la causa come ciò da cui una cosa dipende secondo il proprio essere o il proprio farsi; “— distinzione reale della causa dall’effetto: ciò è evidente, poiché la dipendenza reale fra due cose implica necessariamente la loro effettiva distinzione; “— priorità della causa sull’effetto: ogni causa è precedente al suo effetto secondo un ordine di natura, in quanto quella perfezione che la causa produce nell’effetto deve trovarsi in certo modo «prima» nella causa. In molti casi, questa priorità di natura implica anche una anteriorità cronologica: i genitori sono prima dei figli, e lo scultore prima della statua. Quanto alla stessa azione causale, l’effetto e la sua causa sono correlati e simultanei: la causa è tale mentre causa; l’effetto è effetto mentre viene causato.”(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metafisica, Le Monnier, Florence, 1987, pp. 164-165). 2 casa sin el trabajo de las personas que la han construido, aunque ese trabajo haya influido, más que en el ser actual, en el hacerse del edificio. Esta doble manera de influir en el efecto permite definir la causa como todo aquello de lo que la cosa depende según su ser o su hacerse; “ – distinción real de la causa y el efecto: esto es evidente, pues la dependencia real entre dos cosas entraña necesariamente su efectiva distinción; “ – prioridad de la causa sobre el efecto: toda causa es anterior a su efecto según un orden de naturaleza, en cuanto aquella perfección que la causa otorga o produce en el efecto tiene que encontrarse de algún modo «antes» en la causa. En muchos casos, esta prioridad de naturaleza supone también una anterioridad temporal: los padres son antes que los hijos, y el escultor antes que la estatua. En cuanto a la misma acción causal, el efecto y su causa son correlativos y simultáneos: la causa es causa cuando está causando; el efecto, en el momento de ser causado.”6 “Per capire la natura della causa – che è uno dei principi fondamentali della metafisica…bisogna tener conto che una delle chiavi della nozione di causa, in rapporto a ciò che è causato, e l’influsso reale che esercita su di esso. Intendiamo per causa, quindi, ciò che realmente influisce su una realtà, facendola in certo modo dipendere da sé. “La dipendenza del causato rispetto alla causa è un punto centrale. Senza la causa, non si dà il causato. Una casa, ad esempio, non potrebbe stare in piedi senza i materiali che la compongono – causa materiale – e senza un’adeguata disposizione di questi elementi – causa formale – per cui possiamo dire che la casa dipende da essi secondo il proprio essere. Allo stesso tempo, la casa non esisterebbe neanche senza il lavoro delle persone che l’hanno costruita – causa efficiente – e senza una finalità – causa finale – o motivo della costruzione, dai quali dipende nel suo farsi. Sia in un caso che nell’altro, ciò che è causato dipende realmente dalla sua causa, nel suo essere o nel suo farsi. “In ambienti neopositivisti o a questi vicini, si è preteso di negare questo nocciolo della causa – l’influsso, la dipendenza reale – e di sostituirla con quella di funzione, la quale può venire matematizzata. Così B. Russell affermava: «Non vi è nessun dubbio che il motivo per cui la vecchia ‘legge di causalità’ ha continuato ad occupare i libri dei filosofi, è semplicemente perché l’idea di funzione non è ad essi famigliare».7 Questa posizione condivide un difetto proprio di tutto il neopositivismo: la negazione della metafisica in favore della logica formale. “Altri hanno interpretato le relazioni di successione regolare di fenomeni come se fossero di causalità, applicando l’assioma «post hoc, ergo propter hoc» (avviene dopo questo, dunque avviene a causa di questo). Sostituendo la dipendenza con la sola successione di eventi si dà origine a diversi tipi di storicismo, come ad essempio quelli di Hegel, Comte o Marx. Descrivere o ipotizzare il succedersi di eventi sarebbe una spiegazione sufficiente del perché sono accaduti. In realtà la storia come scienza cerca, nella misura del possibile, di arrivare alle cause per comprendere adeguatamente l’evolversi storico. 6 7 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metafísica, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1989, pp. 185-186. B. RUSSELL, Mysticism and Logic, London, 1918, p. 194. 3 “Sono diverse le conseguenze implicate nella nozione di causalità intesa come reale dipendenza e influsso di una realtà su un’altra: “a) Da ciò che è causato si può risalire alla causa. Il nesso di dipendenza fa sì che in qualche modo nel causato resti traccia del modo di essere della causa. Come vedremo, esso è particolarmente significativo nel caso della causalità efficiente, giacché la perfezione propria dell’effetto si trova sempre nella causa in modo simile, se non superiore. Non sempre è facile la ricerca della causa, ma la mente non riposa finché la trova. “b) La priorità della causa sul causato, secondo un ordine di natura, poiché ciò che è causato, in quanto causato, dipende dalla causa. Evidentemente, se un cane morde un uomo non è che si deve considerare il cane prioritario per natura rispetto all’uomo. Ma l’effetto causato, il morso, non si identifica con il soggetto che subisce l’azione – l’uomo –; e allora non c’è nessun inconveniente per parlare della priorità di natura della causa rispetto all’effetto. In molti casi, questa priorità di natura implica anche un’anteriorità cronologica: i genitori sono prima dei figli, e lo scultore e il bronzo che impiega devono esistere prima della statua; ciononostante – come è stato già detto –, la causalità mai si può ridurre ad una successione temporale. Di fatto, quanto alla stessa azione causale, l’effetto e la sua causa sono correlati e simultanei: la causa è tale mentre causa; l’effetto è effetto mentre viene causato. Ma ciò non vuole dire che necessariamente si dia una dipendenza della causa rispetto al causato. “c) La distinzione reale della causa e il causato: la dipendenza reale di una cosa rispetto ad altra implica necessariamente la loro effettiva distinzione. Tale distinzione, però, non sempre esige separazione: la materia e la forma sono cause intrinseche a una stessa sostanza corporea, ma non esistono separatamente da essa.”8 In order to have a better understanding of what a cause is, it would be good to distinguish between cause and principle, cause and condition, and cause and occasion: Principle A principle is that from which something proceeds in any way whatsoever.9 Aquinas states that “a principle is that from which anything in any way proceeds.”10 “A principle is that from which something proceeds in any manner whatever.”11 A principle “implies only an order of origin, and does not include any notion of an influence, derived from the principle, on those things which follow it.”12 It implies only an order of origin and does not include the idea of a positive influence upon the being of that which proceeds from it. The starting line, for example, is said to be the principle of a race track and a point is said to be principle of a line, but the starting line cannot be said to be the cause of the race track, and the point cannot be said to be the cause of the line. So, a cause is a kind of principle, which involves the added dependence of the 8 L. CLAVELL, La causalità: la sua esperienza e natura, part IV, chapter 2 of L. CLAVELL and M. PÉREZ DE LABORDA, Metafisica, EDUSC, Rome, 2006, pp. 274-276. 9 Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 33, a. 1, c. 10 In I Phys., lect. 1. 11 C. N. BITTLE, The Domain of Being: Ontology, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1941, p. 322. 12 R. P. PHILLIPS, op. cit., p. 233. 4 effect with regard to its origin. Although every cause is a principle, not every principle is a cause. A cause stands to principle as species to genus, that is, a cause is a special kind of principle. Thus, the notion of principle is wider than the notion of cause.13 “El principio: es aquello de lo que algo procede de cualquier modo. Por tanto, toda causa es principio, pero no todo principio es causa. El principio expresa inicio u orden sin incluir un influjo positivo en el ser de lo procedido. En este contexto, el punto debe considerarse principio de la línea, las primeras palabras de un discurso son el inicio del resto de la peroración, y el abanderado, el que da comienzo ala comitiva militar, pero ninguno de los tres es causa de lo que le sigue.”14 “Il principio: è ciò da cui qualcosa procede in qualunque modo. Pertanto, ogni causa è anche principio, ma non ogni principio è causa. Il principio esprime inizio o ordine senza includere l’idea di influsso positivo nell’essere del derivato. In tal senso, il punto deve essere considerato il principio della linea, le prime parole di un discorso sono l’inizio dell’orazione, e il portabandiera è chi dà inizio alla parata militare, ma nessuno dei tre è causa di ciò che segue.”15 Condition A condition is a prerequisite or necessary disposition for the exercise of causality. It is something which is required for a cause to produce some effect. “La condizione è ciò che permette alla causa di produrre il suo effetto.”16 A condition merely renders possible or impedes the action of a cause; as such, it is not endowed with causality. An opening in a darkened cave, for example, is a condition for the cave to be illumined with daylight, but the cause is the sun. An indispensable or necessary condition is a condition for which there is no substitute and is called a conditio sine qua non, while a simply suitable or favorable condition is a non-indispensable 13 “A cause must be prior in nature to its effect, but not necessarily prior in time. In fact the action of the cause and the production of the effect must be simultaneous. Considered formally as correlatives they are simul natura. A principle must likewise be in some sense prior to what proceeds from it, not necessarily, however, by priority of time, nor by priority of nature involving real dependence. The Christian Revelation regarding the Blessed Trinity involves that the First Divine Person is the ‘principle’ from which the Second proceeds, and the First and the Second the ‘principle’ from which the Third proceeds; yet here there is no dependence or inequality, or any priority except the ‘relation of origin’ be called priority”(P. COFFEY, op. cit., p. 358). “A cause, then, is a kind of principle, which involves a dependence of the effect on its origin. Theology teaches that there are relations of procession within the Blessed Trinity, which do not entail causality at all. Even though the Son proceeds from the Father, the former cannot be said to ‘depend’ on the latter, since that would imply an imperfection in the act of being of the Word. Hence, God the Father is the principle of the Son, and both of them are the principle of the Holy Spirit; however, the Father cannot be considered as Cause of the Son, and neither should the Father and the Son be held as the Cause of the Holy Spirit”(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 186-187). “La causa es, pues, un tipo de principio, ya que añade a éste el carácter de dependencia de lo efectuado en relación a su origen. Enseña la Teología que en el seno de la Trinidad se dan relaciones de procedencia sin que haya propiamente causalidad: aunque el Hijo procede del Padre, no cabe afirmar que «dependa» de El, pues eso supondría una imperfección en el Ser del Verbo; por eso el Padre es Principio del Hijo, y ambos del Espíritu Santo, pero no puede sostenerse que sean Causa.”(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 186). “La causa è, dunque, un tipo di principio con in più il carattere di dipendenza dell’effetto rispetto alla sua origine. La Teologia insegna che nel seno della Trinità vi sono delle relazioni di procedenza senza che vi sia propriamente causalità: anche se il Figlio procede dal Padre, non si può affermare che «dipenda» da Lui, poiché questo supporrebbe un’imperfezione nell’essere del Verbo; per questo, il Padre è Principio del Figlio, ed entrambi lo sono dello Spirito Santo, ma non si può sostenere che siano Causa.”(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 165). 14 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 186. 15 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 165. 16 R. JOLIVET, Trattato di filosofia, vol. 4, t. 2 (Metafisica II: Ontologia e Teodicea), Morcelliana, Brescia, 1960, no. 252, p. 144. 5 condition. “A condition is something which is required for the production of some effect: either necessarily, in which case it is called a conditio sine qua non, or necessary condition; or else to facilitate the production of the effect. In neither case does it positively pass into the effect itself: there is no influx from the condition to the effect; and in this if differs from cause.”17 “Vi sono condizioni necessarie, ma non sufficienti; ad esempio, per ottenere una laurea è necessario iscriversi all’Università, ma ovviamente ciò non basta. Altre sono invece necessarie e sufficienti; così se qualcuno promette un milione di euro a chi corra i cento metri in meno di 9,9 secondi, correrli in meno di questo tempo è condizione necessaria e allo stesso tempo sufficiente per meritare i soldi promessi. Le condizioni necessarie si chiamano anche sine qua non. Le sufficienti sono soltanto favorevoli, covenienti, ma non imprescindibili: ad esempio, per superare un esame, può essere utile, ma non necessaria, la lettura di un libro determinato.”18 “By a condition, in the strictest sense of the term, we mean something which does not exercise any positive influence upon the ‘to be’ of the effect, but is a prerequisite for the action of a cause. For example, a connection with a source of electricity is a prerequisite for the incandescence of an electric bulb. The connection does not make the bulb glow, but merely enables electricity to reach the bulb and to produce there incandescence. Hence, a condition differs from a cause in this: that its influence is not positive, but purely dispositive, insofar as it removes obstacles which prevent the cause from acting. The difference between cause and condition may be illustrated by the following example. A stone of fifty pounds is firmly held in place by the suction of mud in a swamp. My efforts to lift it are in vain. A friend comes to help me. Together we lift the stone. Both of us exercise positive influence upon the effect, viz., the change in position of the stone. If, however, my friend limits himself to the removal of the mud around the stone and leaves the rest to me, he would not exercise any positive influence upon the change of position, but his action would remove the obstacle which prevents me from lifting the stone; hence it would be dispositive.”19 “A condition is something required in order that an efficient cause can act, but it does not contribute any positive influence toward the production of the effect itself. That the filament of an electric bulb may become incandescent, it is necessary to push the button of the switch, so that the electric circuit will be closed; but the pushing of the button does not make the filament glow. Clear weather is a condition for effective artillery action; but the weather has in itself nothing to do with shooting off a cannon. “If a condition is so necessary that the efficient cause cannot produce its effect under any circumstances without it, it is called a conditio sine qua non, i.e., ‘a condition without which the cause does not act.’ Thus, the knowledge of a good is the conditio sine qua non for an appetitive faculty to strive for the good. Light is the conditio sine qua non for the act of seeing. It is obvious, however, that the intellect itself does not ‘strive’ for the good, but the appetitive faculty; nor does the light ‘see,’ but the eyes. 17 R. P. PHILLIPS, op. cit., p. 233. L. CLAVELL, La causalità: la sua esperienza e natura, part IV, chapter 2 of L. CLAVELL and M. PÉREZ DE LABORDA, op. cit., pp. 274-276. 19 H. J. KOREN, op. cit., pp. 230-231. 18 6 “Sometimes, the ‘condition’ consists merely in the removal of an obstacle for the cause; the presence of the obstacle hinders the cause from acting. Thus, if a person’s feet are tied, it is a necessary condition for walking that the impediment be removed. If a person is locked in a room, the door must first be unlocked before he can leave the room. The rope and the locked door are obstacles which must be removed; but that the person actually walks, that is due to the person’s own efficient causality.”20 Kreyche gives us yet another example of a condition, and how it contrasts with that of a cause, writing: “Consider, for example, a person who opens a can of dog food. The person who opens the can is truly the cause of the can being opened, but he is not, strictly speaking, the cause of the dog’s eating the food. True enough, the opening of the can bears a relation to the consumption of the food, for if the can had not been opened, the dog could not eat the food. However, the influence of the condition is negative in that it consists in the removal of obstacles without which the effect could not take place. Hence, the role of a condition as such is to make it possible for a cause to exercise its activity. In general, we may define a condition as a circumstance or set of circumstances that makes it possible for something to operate as a cause. Very often it is difficult in practice to distinguish clearly between a condition and a cause without careful, painstaking analysis. However, the basic distinction between condition and cause should be clear.21 “Note: Frequently a whole series of conditions are necessary in order for an agent or a complex series of agents to act. For example, the operation of a car requires the turning of the ignition switch, shifting of gears, inflation of types, and so forth. If any specified condition is such that without it the effect could not take place at all, then this condition is a condition sine qua non. Sometimes, too, it happens that the operation of a cause is contingent upon the fulfillment of an alternative set of conditions. Suppose, for example, that a person wishes to travel by car to a certain destination, and he has a choice of two or more routes. Although none of those routes taken singly is a condition sine qua non, it is necessary in the end to make a definite choice – to take one of them rather than another.”22 Occasion An occasion is a situation or a circumstance or set of circumstances whose presence favors the action of a free cause. It is that which provides an advantageous or favorable opportunity for a free cause to exercise its causality. Sunny weather, for example, is a good occasion for playing soccer in an open field but is neither the cause nor an indispensable condition with respect to the act of playing soccer. Night is an occasion for theft, but is not the cause of theft, the cause being the thief’s disordered will. “An occasion is any circumstance or combination of circumstances favourable to the action of a free cause. For instance, a forced sale is an occasion for buying cheaply; night is an occasion of theft; bad companionship is an 20 C. N. BITTLE, op. cit., p. 336. Our example above is an illustration of what some authors refer to as an “active” condition – that is, in contradistinction to a condition “on the part of the matter,” or a passive condition. As an example of this latter type, consider the need for processing certain types of materials (for example, lumber) before those materials can be used in the production of a certain effect (for example, the building of a garage). Or again, if an artist sculptures in marble, be must use a suitable type of marble. 22 R. P. KREYCHE, First Philosophy, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1959, pp. 235-236. 21 7 occasion of sin. An occasion has no intrinsic connection with the effect as in the case of a principle, nor is it necessary for the production of the effect as in the case of a condition. It is spoken of only in connection with the action of a free cause; and it differs from a cause in having no positive and direct influence on the production of the effect. It has, however, a real though indirect influence on the production of the effect by soliciting and aiding the determination of the free efficient cause to act.”23 “An occasion differs from a condition in that its primary referent is not the subject acted upon but rather the agent that acts; it may be defined as that which affords an opportunity for a cognitive agent to exercise its causality. An occasion may provide a mere opportunity for such an agent to act, or it may serve as a kind of inducement for action, in which case it tends to merge with the act’s final cause. Yet, in its proper understanding, an occasion does not strictly cause the agent to act, being related to the agent’s activity only incidentally, i.e., in a per accidens way.”24 “An occasion is some factor that makes it conducive for a (free) agent to act. Generally, it may be viewed as a circumstance or a set of circumstances that provides a ‘suitable’ opportunity for engaging in a certain type of activity. An occasion is something less than a condition inasmuch as it is not strictly necessary for a given agent to act. In this sense nighttime may be considered as an occasion for theft, though seldom as a condition, and in no sense at all as a cause…a feast, as an occasion for drinking, sometimes perhaps as a condition, but clearly not as a cause. Whether something is to be judged as an occasion or condition will largely depend on the nature of the circumstances themselves. However, an occasion as such is not strictly necessary in order for an agent to act.”25 “A crowd is an occasion for a pickpocket to ply his trade. A tavern may be the occasion for a drunkard to indulge his pet vice. Election time is the occasion for political oratory. The meeting with a friend may be the occasion of a confidential chat. The difference between an ‘occasion’ and a ‘condition’ should be fairly obvious. A condition is such that its fulfillment or presence is required in order that an efficient cause can act; an occasion is not a requirement for action, but its presence is something which merely gives the opportunity for action. Thus, the presence of a tavern gives a drunkard the opportunity to obtain the liquor needed to get intoxicated, and the tavern is for this reason an ‘occasion’ for intoxication; but the possession of a quantity of liquor, sufficient to become intoxicated, is required, and this possession is, therefore, a ‘condition’ for intoxication. “Neither a condition nor an occasion amounts to the causality of an efficient cause. They exert an indirect influence on the agent to act, but it is the action of the agent which positively influences the production of something; and efficient causality consists precisely in this productive action of the agent. To take the example just mentioned; it is neither the presence of the tavern (occasion) nor the possession of the liquor (condition) which makes the drunkard intoxicated, but the actual drinking (action) of the man himself (agent).”26 23 P. COFFEY, op. cit., p. 359. W. WALLACE, op. cit., p. 102. 25 R. P. KREYCHE, op. cit., pp. 236-237. 26 C. N. BITTLE, op. cit., pp. 336-337. 24 8